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ABSTRACT
USER’S ABILITY TO DETECT FAKE NEWS IN ONLINE ENVIRONMENTS
Aleeza Gardner
April 24, 2019
Technology has drastically changed the way people consume news. Due to the
rise of online spaces built for users to share content, there has been a rise in the spread of
false information. Social media platforms, Facebook specifically, provide their users with
personalized content based on their interests. The ease of spreading information online
coupled with the anonymity of the Internet, creates a breeding ground for potential
misuse of information. This study sought to examine how users view themselves and
others were influenced by fake news on social media if the post is denoted as fake, or if
the post confirms preexisting beliefs.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Internet Responsibility
The Internet has created an environment where users can stay connected to the
world remotely and in real time. People are now able to shop, get news, stream movies
and games, and connect with other users both locally and globally. The vast amount of
freedom the Internet provides is paired with an equal amount of responsibility for users
and websites alike. The Internet provides a space where news companies can share
breaking news within minutes of an event; but this rush to publish quickly, comes with a
responsibility to ensure that the information is accurate and unbiased. Similarly, retailers
can access customers in remote areas, and users can provide feedback on purchased
items. However, retailers must be aware that customers have increased agency to hold
them accountable for bad behavior negative feedback that is visible to other consumers.
Social media platforms, such as Facebook, are not exempted from social
responsibility on the Internet. Facebook seeks to give users a clean and concise presence
to share information and content with other users. On the site, users can create and share
their own content or re-share content from other accounts. When users use Facebook,
content relevancy is determined through artificial intelligence with algorithms sorting
information based on, among other things, previous interactions of the users. As a result
of the algorithmically curated newsfeed, every user experience is unique to them where
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the most pertinent content appears first, while less relevant content is lost or muted. In,
turn users only have a limited time to browse social media. Therefore, the action is
justified as it enhances the user experience by providing relevant-to-them information at
the top of their feed. This has the consequence of allowing social media platforms to act
as gatekeepers.
Users have a responsibility to fact check and be conscious of the information they
are consuming. Furthermore, any account sharing information in online spaces has an
ethical responsibility to ensure that shared information is accurate. Despite this, given
social media platforms have the ability to show and hide content from users, it is their
responsibility to inform users about any potential threats to the validity information
occurring on the website.
One specific example of the “responsibility debate” with respect to information
verification on social media can be seen in the case of Facebook’s experience with
Russian accounts during the run-up to the 2016 Presidential election.
Timeline and History
While false information is not a new concept, the Internet allows people to spread
information without proper fact checking. Because of the ease, people can create and
spread news on their own with few or no implications. With the rise of social media,
there was also a rise in fake news being spread on the platforms. The fake news came
from various accounts, but specifically, there were bots from Russia sending out
information. Facebook was aware of Russian accounts as early as 2013 and informed the
FBI of potential Russian presence and fake news on Facebook (Hudgens & Newcomb,
2017). Specifically, online bots (i.e. automated accounts) were sharing news stories that
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contained only partial facts and were becoming more prevalent. By 2016, Politicians
called for awareness to be brought to fake news because it was influencing opinion and
spreading misinformation (Hudgens & Newcomb, 2017). However, Facebook did not
start notifying users until late 2017 (Hudgens & Newcomb, 2017). Users were exposed to
false or misleading information for years before they became aware of the choices made
by Facebook to keep these misleading accounts from the public. During the 2016 United
States Presidential Elections, social media platforms announced the Russian presence.
The Russian accounts were sharing fake news stories intended to misinform readers
(Hudgens & Newcomb, 2017). Although the harm seemed minimal, the effects were seen
across the platforms with people believing and re-sharing the posts as though they were
truth. At first it was thought the impact of this presence was minimal - less than 2% of the
overall user population consisted of fake accounts - but as time progressed, more
accounts were discovered, specifically Russian bot accounts (Hudgens & Newcomb,
2017).
Fake news is not a new concept, but the Internet allows the volume and reach of
fake news to increase. Social media platforms generate revenue by giving businesses the
ability to advertise to users. The advertisements are sponsored and can target specific
groups of people at a relatively low cost. Targeting for advertisements can be done by
demographic and psychographic information provided by the user or gathered by the
user’s online habits. Russian intelligence programs exploited Facebook’s advertising
tools to reach American voters. It is reported more than $100,000 in paid advertisements
were for Russian troll accounts. It is also reported more than 126 million Facebook users
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were exposed to Russian backed content, an increase in what was previously reported
(Bump, 2018; Hudgens & Newcomb, 2017).
The content the Russian accounts were creating was about many different social
issues occurring in the United States, but the most frequently occurring themes were
politically charged. One can only assume that these politically-oriented messages were
designed to influence, in some manner, the election process. Although social media
platforms initially denied content on their websites had interfered in the 2016 election
(Hudgens & Newcomb, 2017), in 2017 Facebook began to notify users of any contact
they may have previously had with fake accounts. They also started testing ways of
alerting users of potential compromised content. One method used was flagging stories
other users noted as potentially fake. The flag approach had drawbacks and was criticized
by academics because it could offend some users with deeply held beliefs and attitudes
(Facebook Ditches Fake News Warning Flag, 2017). Users were also able to see if they
had any interaction with fake accounts through the help center feature on Facebook
(Guynn, 2017). These reactive responses to the Russian message bot issue, were seen by
many as too little too late (Facebook Ditches Fake News Warning Flag, 2017).
Statement of the Problem
Reliance on the Internet and social media platforms for information and news has
become common. Given the speed at which online information travels, the news media
is under pressure to use social media to disperse accurate and timely information.
However, the anonymous nature of the Internet allows governments, political parties, and
even individuals to pose as legitimate news media and spread false or misleading
information to further their own political or economic goals. Additionally, social media
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platforms have chosen to take a light touch approach to avoid encumbering free speech,
which begets the question of whether these passive reactions (e.g., flagging posts as
originating from a questionable source) have any impact on user cognition, conviction or
behavior.
Purpose of the Study
This study seeks to test whether a passive disclaimer warning on social media
posts impacts users’ perceptions of the posts and intended to share the posts with

others. Specifically, it will assess the influence of the disclaimer on three key message
effects identified as important determinants of persuasion.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Technological advancements grant freedom to access information remotely and in
real time. The Internet allows people to stay up to date with news around the world as it
happens. One notable issue with the Internet as a platform for news is the spread of
misleading or false information to others either knowingly or unknowingly. Although the
spread of misinformation is an issue in offline contexts, the difference between the online
and offline environments is the potential audience reached. Specifically, an online post
can go viral worldwide within hours whereas historically it would take days or weeks for
same information to spread via word-of-mouth or the press. Furthermore, the Internet and
social media websites allow users to have mass amounts of information at their fingertips.
Because of the large amount of information users encounter daily, several heuristics are
employed to sort through the “facts” and determine which are indeed based in reality and
which are untrue. The first is cognitive bias.
Cognitive Biases Effecting Evaluations of Facts
Confirmation bias, an aspect of cognitive bias, is a deviation from rational
reasoning based on preferences for information that affirm one’s worldview. A result of
this is that people seek out confirming information and discount or avoid disconfirming
information (Winter, Metzger, & Flanagin, 2016). Studies have shown that people avoid
seeking information that contradicts their beliefs as a defense mechanism or simply to
preserve their current worldview (Winter, Metzger, & Flanagin, 2016). In terms of social
6

media, people will choose to follow and/or interact with accounts that solidifying
their pre-held notions and beliefs.
Continued effect is when people remember information as it is related to their
preexisting beliefs, and in some cases distort the information. People may not question or
seek alternative or counter arguments for information they already believe to be true
(Knobloch-Westerwich & Meng, 2011). Continued effect is especially true in social
media settings. Users have a limited amount of time to review information. Therefore, if
a user sees information similar to what they already believe to be true, they will take it for
truth without properly examining that information or seeking alternative information to
contradict it.
Selective exposure is when social media users only see what other users who hold
similar attitudes or beliefs as them post or share (Pearson & Knobloch-Westerwich,
2018). Although users theoretically have the potential to see information they would
otherwise not be exposed to through their online network’s sharing and posting of
information, in actuality they may only see information that is similar to their own beliefs
(Eisend, 2017). However, people do not generally avoid information they do not agree
with; they simply do not get exposed to it because of the natural tendency of people to
cluster with others who have similar attitudes. While selective exposure is the result of
active user choices in who and what they follow on social media, it is also occurs
passively based on a person’s social circle where people tend to associate with others
who hold similar views and attitudes (Winter, Metzger, & Flanagin, 2016). Thus, even if
people do not actively avoid information that is not consistent with their own beliefs, they
also do not seek alternative material. Knobloch-Westerwich and Meng (2011) argue that
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selective exposure is a heuristic employed by people to protect their pre-held attitudes
and beliefs to maintain a favorable self-image.
Confirmation bias, selective exposure, and the continued effect work in concert to
skew social media users’ perception of what is true. First, selective exposure is much
more likely to occur in online networks because the connections (e.g. being “friends”
with someone) formed there are exclusively voluntary. For example, Facebook requires a
user to “like” or “friend” someone to get that person’s or page’s posts on their newsfeed.
This is a required step to see information shared by another user and results in the focal
user’s newsfeed being tailored to what they want to see or have subscribed to see. Users
will also see information their friends share regardless of the factuality or if they agree or
disagree with that information. This may result in users being exposed to posts they may
not have otherwise seen. Second, because online users must make judgements regarding
a large number of messages that they see in a short timeframe (Antonopoulos, Veglis,
Gardikiotis, Kotsakis, & Kalliris, 2015; Atwood, 1994), these judgements can be based
on previous knowledge held about the topic of the message (Atwood, 1994). This is
confirmation bias. Finally, when exposed to messages, people tend to remember
messages in ways that confirm their preexisting beliefs (Atwood, 1994).
Selective exposure, confirmation bias, and the continued effect bias are becoming
more problematic not only because of users having to choose what information they want
to see and believe, but because of built in algorithms on social media websites. The
algorithms used by social media websites sort the information shown to users based on
several factors. One of these factors is the amount of “likes” or “shares” a post has and
how many of a user’s friends have interacted with that post (Antonopoulos, Veglis,
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Gardikiotis, Kotsakis, & Kalliris, 2015). Coupled with the algorithms sorting information
and users selecting what source they want to receive their information from, selective
exposure is a part of social media users have to accept in terms of using the platforms
(Eisend, 2017). Another factor the algorithms use to sort information is who the user
engages with on a regular basis on social media. For example, if a user often interacts
with another user or a page, the algorithm will automatically sort that person or page to
the top of the user’s news feed.
Astroturfing
Astroturfing complicates the process of users sifting through information on
social media to determine what is and is not credible. Astroturfing is the “manipulation of
public opinion, made possible by the anonymity of the Internet, which makes it difficult
to know when commentary on social media is being manipulated by those with vested
interests” (Peng, Detchon, & Choo, 2017). Originally, online astroturfing was
predominantly found in marketing where businesses paid people to review their products
online to deceive the general public and sway mass opinion. More recently, online
astroturfing has found its way into all areas, including the political sphere. Propaganda, as
distinct from astroturfing, is successful by targeting specific groups and solidifying
already held notions and attitudes (Brennen, 2017). However, propaganda does not, by
definition, involve hiding the identity of the source. Not all propaganda attempts to
spread extreme or polarizing material. Some propaganda spread in the 2016 election
contained small amounts of wrong information (Timberg, 2016).
Astroturfing is not confined to online spaces and is not a new concept (Lee,
2010). However, it has gained traction and awareness recently due to the ease and
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anonymous nature of the Internet (Sisson, 2017). Specifically, the low cost and ease of
creating online advertisements creates a perfect environment for astroturfers to target
people and play on their views. Creating fake profiles on social media is fast and easy
with very little repercussion (Peng, Detchon, & Choo, 2017). As a result, people or
groups can create fake profiles and spread information without actually being tied to that
information or being held accountable. For example, during the 2016 election, the ease of
remotely creating social media accounts under pseudonyms meant that Russian agents
were able to create accounts solely used to disperse false or hyper-partisan news with
little to no repercussions.
The presence of astroturfing in social media also hinders users from being able to
accurately assess source credibility. When fake profiles and pages are created on social
media, the true source of the message can be impossible to find. Hidden sources create a
host of problems for users because it forces them to evaluate the source credibility of
information using heuristics as it is impossible to evaluate the expertise or benevolence of
a source, two important factors that comprise source credibility, without knowing the
identity of a source. One heuristics often employed by users to assess credibility on
social media is the “bandwagon effect” or social proof. Thus, the behavior of others
suggests how they should evaluate a source. A user may also choose to see how many
followers the source has or how many “likes”, “shares”, or “comments” their posts have
when viewing and determining to believe the information from that source (Castillo,
Mendoza, & Poblete, 2013). In short, the lack of information regarding the original
source means that users must apply their best judgement regarding the veracity of a
message based on the information and account itself.
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Consequences
Both selective exposure and astroturfing create an environment where users have
to be suspicious of the information they are viewing. Although being critical consumer of
online information is generally a good idea, cognitive biases deter users from seeking
alternative sources or fact checking.
Social media users, who would typically rely on news sources to act as a
gatekeeper to prevent the dissemination of false information, now have to take on the
gatekeeper role on their own. Traditionally, trusted news sources would be selective in
the information they cover. Journalists are held to a high standard and are internally
checked to ensure the standard is being withheld. As the use of social media rises, and the
ease of creating and dispersing information rises with it, users must be mindful of the
information they are consuming and be cautious of believing a source upon first
interaction with that source.
There are more consequences to astroturfing than simply deceiving users who see
it as propaganda. Once people believe the information, they begin to spread it as truth to
their own followers. Multiple accounts can share the same message solidifying the false
information in the minds of users as credible. After viewing such information by fake
accounts, people create a new normal for the type of informant they receive (Sisson,
2017). For example, if a user sees a post by a fake account that confirms what they
already hold to be true, they will expect more information like that and reject information
that contradicts that information. Although the concept of astroturfing may seem
harmless, the attempted manipulation of mass opinion can create real problems for
receivers, especially receivers of political astroturfing (Castillo, Mendoza, & Poblete,
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2013). The problems include mistrust or simply believing information without fact
checking of all news and information a user may receive on social media (Sisson, 2017).
Perceived Influence
Third-Person Effect
Third-person effect is defined by Davison as the overestimation of the influence
of media on the attitudes of others. People tend to believe they are less influenced by the
media than others who see the same message. (Davidson, 1983; Atwood, 1994). It is
argued that all media is persuasive even if the intent of the message is not persuasive by
nature (Davidson, 1983). Media messages from the news is important to consider when
looking at third-person effect because it is meant to inform the public, but people must
make their own judgment about the information they are receiving. When making
judgements about a message people should first be aware there is the potential for all
users to be influenced by the message. Evaluation of the message is generally based on a
person’s bank of knowledge about a particular topic, it is then that a person decides to
either accept or reject the message and comes to understand the potential conclusions
others might draw from the same material (Atwood, 1994).
While there are several factors involved in third person effect, ego is one that
influences a person’s perception of information. Ego involvement is “self-oriented and
consists of self-esteem, self-identity, and moral values” (Obeidat, Xiao, Iyer, &
Nicholson, 2017). The pre-held notions can create bias that a person uses to assess new
information. The more a person cares about a specific topic, the higher their ego
involvement; and the higher the ego involvement, the more difficult it is to change their
attitudes and beliefs (Ramos, 2017). Highly ego-involved individuals were not only more
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likely to reject messages that threatened their self-concept, but were also more likely to
presume that those messages would exert a strong effect on neutral receivers to sway
them from to side (Perloff, 1989). Therefore, it is important to know why a person
chooses to accept a message because it will play a role in determining if they believe
others will influence by a message. People are then more susceptible to messages if they
have a vested interest or see the information as positive to their overall self-image and
belief system (Buturoiu, Durach, Udrea, & Corbu, 2017). An example would be if
someone received a message that supported already held beliefs and attitudes about their
political party or religion. According to Buturoiu, Durach, Urdrea, and Corbu (2017) the
third-person effect is greater when media content is seen as negative. Therefore, if a
person perceives a message as overall good, and it supports their pre-held notions, they
are less likely to have third-person effect (Buturoiu, Durach, Udrea, & Corbu, 2017).
People who are vested in messages are more likely to spend more time reading and
making judgements about a message than those with little or no vested interest (Eisend,
2017).
Influences of the media can be seen through exposure of a message. Social media,
Facebook specifically, is built to show users relevant material based on their interests.
The uncontrolled filtering of messages creates selective exposure of which users may not
be aware. The platform is built to appeal to each user and relay information to them
quickly (Antonopoulos, Veglis, Gardikiotis, Kotsakis, & Kalliris, 2015). Users must
make judgements regarding the messages they see in a short timeframe (Antonopoulos,
Veglis, Gardikiotis, Kotsakis, & Kalliris, 2015; Atwood, 1994). These judgements can
be based on previous knowledge held about the topic of the message (Atwood, 1994).
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Rationale
Studies have shown that astroturfing is successful in persuading people or
changing people’s attitudes and beliefs. Although a shift in mindset caused by
astroturfing (while unethical) might have minimal consequences when done in marketing,
political astroturfing has far more insidious effects. The presence of accounts
intentionally spreading false or misleading information on social media during an
election could sway public opinion on important matters including who to vote for and
general knowledge about the opposing political parties. Therefore, this study sought to
see if public opinion is swayed by information on social media websites.
H1: The presence of a disclaimer (flagged vs. unflagged post) and the accord of
information in a Facebook post with participants’ political leanings (message
support general political leaning vs. message is in conflict with general political
leaning) will interact to affect perceptions by the participant of the likelihood that
others attitudes would be affected by the information contained in the posts (the
third-person effect).
The third person effect occurs in both online and offline spaces. First introduced
by Davidson (1989), people believe others are more influenced by media coverage than
themselves. This study seeks to see if this holds true when people are confronted with
fake information on social media websites.
H2: The presence of a disclaimer (flagged vs. unflagged post) and the accord of
information in a Facebook post with participants’ political leanings (message
support general political leaning vs. message is in conflict with general political
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leaning) will interact to affect participants’ perceptions of the accuracy of the
information contained in the post (perceived information accuracy).
Finally, social media websites did several things to combat the spread fake
accounts and misleading information after the public became aware of the fake accounts
on the platform. One of those efforts was flagging posts with a banner at the bottom
warning users of potential inaccuracies. This study seeks to see if those efforts were
effective or if they were merely an attempt by the social media platform to save face to
their millions of users.
H3: The presence of a disclaimer (flagged vs. unflagged post) and the accord of

information in a Facebook post with participants’ political leanings (message
support general political leaning vs. message is in conflict with general political
leaning) will interact to affect participants’ intention to share the post with others
(behavioral intention).
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
To test these three hypotheses, I designed a post-test only 2 x 2 factorial design where I
created four different stimuli replicating the look and feel of Facebook posts to create the
following message exposure conditions:
Table 1
Message Exposure Groups

Concordant

Discordant

Unflagged

Flagged

Democrats and saw Black

Democrats and saw Black

Lives Matter post

Lives Matter post

Republicans and saw Blue

Republicans and saw Blue

Lives Matter post

Lives Matter post

Democrats and saw Blue

Democrats and saw Blue

Lives Matter post

Lives Matter post

Republicans and saw

Republicans and saw

Black Lives Matter post

Black Lives Matter post
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IVs were: 1) concordant/discordant message (whether or not participant saw a message
that aligned with his or her political leanings based on the Blue Lives Matter movement
(BuLM) and the Black Lives Matter movement (BkLM)).
2) un/flagged message (whether or not participant saw a message that contained a
disclaimer at the bottom stating that the message was “disputed by third party checkers”).
The study sought to determine how these two independent variables influence
three dependent variables: perceived message effect on others, perceived information
accuracy, and intention to share information with others. To test these effects, I designed
four fictitious Facebook posts to satisfy the four conditions created by crossing the IVs.
After describing the study using an approved IRB preamble for survey research,
individuals who agreed to participate were randomly assigned into one of the four
treatment conditions.
A 2 X 2 factorial design tested concordant/discordant and flagged/unflagged post
in social media influences behavioral intent and perceived information accuracy when
evaluating news in an online environment. Participants were randomly assigned one of
four conditions mirroring the manipulation of social media notification protocol. While
political affiliation is an independent variable, the concern of the study is not to
determine how each party reacts to being exposed to fake news, but rather how the parties
overall react to fake news.
Stimuli
The conditions shown to participants were mock Facebook posts directly
reflecting posts made by misleading accounts on Facebook prior to the election during
the 2016 presidential campaign. The mock Facebook posts consisted of images with text
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headlines and post footer showing the number of times the post was shared, liked, and/or
commented on by other users. They were created in Adobe Photoshop to resemble real
world posts.
This study used a 2 X 2 experimental design to generate its stimuli. First,
Facebook posts were created to reflect contrasting narratives about an encounter between
police and a young black man from the perspective of Black Lives Matter activists and
Blue Lives Matter supporters. The Black Lives Matter movement seeks to bring
awareness and stop violence and oppression to African Americans. The Blue Lives
movement strives to bring attention to the dangers and sacrifices of police officers. The
Blue Lives movement was a direct response to the Black Lives Matter movement.
The Black Lives Matter and Blue Lives Matter posts mirrored each other with the
page name, logo, photo, and text. The narrative of the Black Lives Matter post involved
police approaching a young African American man while he was leaving his high school
and treating him as a suspect when he reached to get his cell phone from his pocket. In
contrast, the Blue Lives Matter narrative concerned a young African American teenager
who when approached by police leaving his high school reached into his pocket for what
was thought to be a weapon. Second, posts indicated whether they have been flagged or
not as potentially misleading. Specifically, there were two versions of both the Black
Lives Matter and Blue Lives matter posts. One version was a typical Facebook post
without any indication that the contained information might be misleading. Another
version of the post was identical with the same text, image, and headline, but included a
flag at the bottom of the image that read, “This post has been disputed.” Facebook used
similar flags at the bottom of their posts after the 2016 election to combat the spread of
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fake news. The flag at the bottom of the post is intended to alert users that the
information within the post may be incorrect. By notifying users of its potential
inaccuracy, this study sought to examine whether using a disclaimer would influence
user’s intention to share content or believe the contained information.
Procedures
The experiment was conducted online using Google Forms. A link was emailed or
posted on Blackboard for students to follow. After clicking on the study link in the
solicitation email, participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions using a
randomized URL redirect hosted by Google Scripts written in JavaScript. Students were
directed to a Google Form where they were given instructions, shown a preamble consent
a brief description of the purpose of the experiment. After viewing and consenting to
participation via a preamble consent form, and asked to fill out a questionnaire to
measure intent to share these posts. Students were presented with stimuli and asked
questions to third person effect, perceived information accuracy, behavior intent, and
demographic information. At the end of the questionnaire, students were given a link to a
separate Google Forms and were asked to fill in their name and instructor information for
the sole purpose of giving extra credit.
Measures
The study included two independent variables, three dependent variables, and a variety of
demographic questions.
Independent variables: Two independent variables were created for use in this
experiment. The first independent variable was researcher manipulated. I created two
Facebook posts that contained the disclaimer statement at the bottom of the post
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indicating that the facts of the post were disputed by third-party fact checkers. The
second IV was concordant/discordant message. To determine if the participant saw a
concordant or discordant message, a generic question to determine their political
identification was asked, then the data were separated into Black Lives Matter and Blue
Lives Matter and the political affiliation question was used to determine if the participant
was a Democrat or Republican based on if they said they were very likely to vote for a
Democratic candidate or not likely to vote for a Democratic candidate. More specifically,
the concordant/discordant message groups were based on natural response variation from
the following question: “If you know nothing about either candidate other than political
affiliation, how likely would you be to vote for a Democrat?” The question was asked on
a five-point Likert response scale from very unlikely to very likely. Participants were
assumed to be identity as a Democrat if they gave a response of likely or very likely.
Participants were assumed to be identified as Republican if they gave a response of
neither, unlikely, or very unlikely. The concordant group was created by matching
individuals identifying as a Democrat with the Black Lives Matter message stimulus and
individuals identify as a republican with the Blue Lives Matter message. The discordant
group was created by matching individuals identifying as a Democrat with the Blue Lives
Matter message stimulus and individuals identifying as a Republican with Black Lives
Matter message stimulus.
Dependent variables: The three dependent variables of interest in the study are discussed
below. They include the perceptions by the participant of the likelihood that others
attitudes would be affected by the information contained in the posts (the third-person
effect); perceptions of the accuracy of the information contained in the posts (Perceived
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information accuracy); and reported likelihood to share the posts with others (behavioral
intention).
Third Person Effect. Two items were queried on a five-point Likert scale with
response options ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree was used to measure
the third person effect. The measure for the Third person effect was adapted from
McLeod, Eveland, and Nathanson’s (1997) scale for the third person effect. The two
questions were asked to measure the difference in how much participants thought they
were influenced by the conditions, verses how much they thought others would be
influenced by the conditions. An example item read, “Overall how much do you think the
attitudes of others would be influenced by news on social media?” The “effect” variable
was created by subtracting and individuals’ response to the question about the level of
influence others would experience from their personal perceived level of influence.
Thus, negative variable scores should be interpreted as a respondent reporting that others
will be more affect by the information than they believe themselves to be. In comparison,
positive scores should be interpreted as a respondent feeling as though he or she would be
more influenced by the information than others. The discrepancy variable had a mean
score of 1.238 (SD = 1.52).
Perceived Information Accuracy. A five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly
agree to strongly disagree was used to measure perceived information accuracy
(accuracy, believability, and trustworthy). Perceived information accuracy was assessed
using a modified scale from Appleman and Sundar (2016) to reflect information seen on
a social networking website. Three questions were asked to measure how participants
viewed the information they were seeing. An example item read, “This post was
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accurate.” A composite scale score was created by averaging participants’ responses to
the three items. The scale had a mean score of 5.98 (SD = 2.07, Cronbach’s Alpha =
.67).
Behavioral intent. Behavioral intent was measured using items written by the
researcher to measure if the participant would share the information with others. A fivepoint Likert scale was used with choices ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
Two questions were asked to measure if a participant is likely to share the information in
the condition with others on a social media platform. An example item read, “I am likely
to share this post with others.” The scale had a mean score of 1.97 (SD = 1.91,
Cronbach’s Alpha = .845).
Demographic variables: To gain a better understanding of the distribution of participants
around key demographic information, I asked the following questions for descriptive
purposes:
Year in school. Specifically, I asked “What year in school are you?” with the
following response options: Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, Senior.
Race. Specifically, “what do you identify as?” with the following response
options: White, Black, Hispanic, Other.
Social media habits: to gain insight into how often a participant uses social media,
questions were asked about usage and what accounts they followed. The following
questions were asked:
Use Facebook. Specifically, “Do you actively use Facebook?” with the following
response options: Very Rarely, Rarely, Sometimes, Frequently, Very Frequently.
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Frequency of use. Specifically, “How many times a week do you log into your Facebook
account?” with the following response options: 1-2 times a week, 3-4 times a week, 5-6
times a week, daily.
Account following: Specifically, “I follow national or local news station accounts
on Facebook (NPR, Fox News, CNN).” With the following response options: strongly
disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, strongly agree.
Participants
I recruited undergraduate students at the University of Louisville (N = 179) from
communication classes. Students could receive extra credit as an incentive to participate
in the study. Although names were collected, they were kept separate from the data to
ensure that the study results remained anonymous. Participants reported their race as
White (70.4%), Black (9.5%), Hispanic (7.8%), Other (10.1%). Their year in school was
reported as Freshmen (24%), Sophomore (27.4%), Junior (22.3%), Senior (20.7%). The
questionnaire included basic questions regarding demographic/psychographic
information at the end. Students were also asked about their social media habits.
Participants reported using Facebook very rarely (20.7%), rarely (12.8%), sometimes
(24.6%), often (25.7%), and very often (12.8%). They reported getting news from
Facebook Strongly Disagree (36.9%), Disagree (34.1%), Neutral (12.8%), Agree
(11.7%), and Strongly Agree (1.1%).
Analysis
Data analysis progressed in three phases. First, I engaged in data cleansing and
preparation. Next, I tested my main hypotheses. And finally, I tested additional
hypotheses on a subset of the data.
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Data preparation: To begin the analyses of these data, I cleaned and checked the data for
adherence to the underlying assumptions of a factorial analysis of variance. Data cleaning
conducted in Microsoft Excel to find any outliers or missing data.
Tests of Main Hypotheses: Next a series of three 2 x 2 factorial ANOVAs were
conducted to test each of the three main hypotheses.
H1: The presence of a disclaimer (flagged vs. unflagged post) and the accord of
information in a Facebook post with participants’ political leanings (message support
general political leaning vs. message is in conflict with general political leaning) will
interact to affect perceptions by the participant of the likelihood that others attitudes
would be affected by the information contained in the posts (the third-person effect).
H2: The presence of a disclaimer (flagged vs. unflagged post) and the accord of
information in a Facebook post with participants’ political leanings (message support
general political leaning vs. message is in conflict with general political leaning) will
interact to affect participants’ perceptions of the accuracy of the information contained in
the post (perceived information accuracy).
H3: The presence of a disclaimer (flagged vs. unflagged post) and the accord of
information in a Facebook post with participants’ political leanings (message support
general political leaning vs. message is in conflict with general political leaning) will
interact to affect participants’ intention to share the post with others (behavioral
intention).
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Data Analysis
The data were analyzed using a 2 X 2 between groups factorial ANOVA. The
independent variables are political affiliation, and identified and not identified posts; the
dependent variables were user’s intent to share a post on Facebook and perception of fake
news on social media. The data was cleaned using Microsoft Excel to check for any
outliers through visual inspection. Cases with predominantly missing data was excluded
from being analyzed. Data was analyzed at a significance level of p < .05 to reject the
null. All analysis was run using SPSS.
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis one tested whether the presence of a disclaimer (flagged vs. unflagged
post) and the accord of information in a Facebook post with participants’ political
leanings (message support general political leaning vs. message is in conflict with general
political leaning) will interact to affect perceptions by the participant of the likelihood
that others attitudes would be affected by the information contained in the posts (the
third-person effect).
The results of 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA indicated there is no interaction between
flagged message content and concordance of message with political identity and the third
person discrepancy effect variable F (1, 171) = .559, p >.05. Therefore, I failed to reject
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the null hypothesis. There were, however, two main effects for each of the
independent variables (flagged: p=.04; concordance: p = .018).
Table 2
F Statistic and Related Levels for Each Effect Tested on The Third-Person Effect

FlaggedUnflagged *
Concordance
FlaggedUnflagged
Concordance

F
.559

Sig.
.456

4.277
5.754

.040
.018

Table 3
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Third-Person Effect

Unflagged

Flagged

Main Effect

Concordant

-.622 ± 1.14

-1.265± 1.753

-.989±1.55

Discordant

-1.341 ± 1.41

-1.643± 1.51

-1.488±1.46

Main Effect

-1.012± 1.34

-1.440±1.65

Figure 1 below demonstrates the significant main effect of the concordant and discordant
groups, as well as the main effect between the flagged and unflagged groups.
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Hypothesis two tested whether the presence of a disclaimer (flagged vs. unflagged
post) and the accord of information in a Facebook post with participants’ political
leanings (message support general political leaning vs. message is in conflict with general
political leaning) will interact to affect participants’ perceptions of the accuracy of the
information contained in the post (perceived information accuracy).
The results of a 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA indicated social media users are aware
fake news does influence other users, F (1, 171) = .261, p > .05. After data analysis, I
failed to reject the null hypothesis. However, a main effect was found for
concordant/discordant (p = .000). Table 3 below provides F statistics and p values for all
of the effects tested for this hypothesis.
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Table 4
F Statistic and Related Levels For Each Effect Tested on Perceived Information Accuracy

Interaction between
flagged/unflagged and
concord/discordant
Concord/discordant
FlaggedUnflagged

F
.261

Sig.
.610

14.623
2.100

.000
.149

Table 5.
Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Information Accuracy
Unflagged

Flagged

Main Effect

Concordant

2.23 ± .738

2.136 ± .649

2.1780±.687

Discordant

1.8963 ± .693

1.698 ± .641

1.8008±.644

Figure 2
Provides the graph below demonstrates the significant main effect of the concordant and
discordant groups.
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Hypothesis three tested the presence of a disclaimer (flagged vs. unflagged post)
and the accord of information in a Facebook post with participants’ political leanings
(message support general political leaning vs. message is in conflict with general political
leaning) will interact to affect participants’ intention to share the post with others
(behavioral intention). The results of a 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA indicated that identifying
fake or misleading news on social media does not change a user’s attitude toward that
information, F(1, 171) = .054, p > .05. Therefore, I failed to reject the null hypothesis.
Table 6
F Statistic and Related Levels for Each Effect Tested on Behavior Intent

FlaggedUnflagged *
Concordance
FlaggedUnflagged
Concordance

F
.054

Sig.
.817

3.035
2.772

.083
.098
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations of Behavioral Intent
Unflagged

Flagged

Concordant

1.218 ± 1.056

1.00 ± .995

Discordant

1.0113 ± .991

.726 ± .726

Figure 3 below demonstrates the lack of significant effects between the groups.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Overview
While some of the information distributed on the Internet is beneficial to users,
fake or misleading information has become common and widespread (Peng, Detchon, &
Choo, 2017). The evaluation of the credibility and accuracy of information on the
Internet is the responsibility of both users and content creators. In the absence of
information about the source, one heuristic users employ to assess the credibility of a
source is how many people follow the account (Castillo, Mendoza, & Poblete, 2013).
Perhaps, the most important implication of false or misleading information, is its ability
to influence public opinion on controversial issues. Therefore, this study examined how
false information about politically polarizing issues is evaluated by social media users
with deeply engrained political ideologies.
These results solidify studies about confirming and disconfirming messages in
that a significant main effect for concordance of the message was found for the third
person effect and the perceived accuracy of information on social media platforms. There
is a significant amount of coverage about fake news in the media and the denial it had
any influence on the American people during the election (Popken, 2019). The results of
this study show that people do feel they and/or others were influenced by what they have
seen on social media. With respect to my first hypothesis test, respondents perceived that
the message would have a similar effect on themselves as compared with others when the
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message supported their political ideologies. But, when the message did not support their
political ideologies (i.e., it was discordant with their political identity), they were more
likely to report that others would be more affected than themselves. A similar result was
noted for the effect of message concordance on respondents’ perceptions of the accuracy
of the information presented. When the message supported their political identities,
respondents were more likely to perceive the information in the message as credible as
compared to when the message was in opposition to their political identities. Perhaps of
more interesting note, however, the concordance of the message with political identity
did not have a significant effect on intention to share the post, which suggests that sharing
behavior may be predicated on factors other than perceived information accuracy and
perceived influence. Although not tested in this study, additional factors such as the
number of likes and shares a post has received should be included in future analyses.
The results of this study also show that when a disclaimer posted to social media
message, its effect was minimal. The disclaimer did not impact perceived information
accuracy, nor did it change respondents’ intentions to share the post. It did significantly
impact respondents’ perceptions of how they thought others might be affected by the
notice. That is, when the post was flagged as containing questionable fact, respondents
thought that others would be more affected by this notation than would they. When the
disclaimer was not present, the discrepancy between perceived message impact was less
extreme; although respondents still tended to report that others would be more influenced
by the information than they thought they would themselves. These findings indicate that
Facebook’s disclaimer was essentially ineffective at combating the spread of fake news.
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Participants in the study were aware of fake news, but still chose to be a part of the
platform and use it, even on a weekly basis.

Limitations of the Study
There were some limitations to the study. First, students could have answered the
questions in ways that they felt were socially desirable. Although the survey was
anonymous, some students still could have not been completely truthful with how they
answered the questions. Second, this study did not ask about participants’ political
affiliations directly. While the experiment did ask about political identity, the question
asked how likely a person was to vote for a generic democratic candidate which might
not translate directly to official political affiliation. Additionally, this variable was
created by grouping participants into either an “Identifies as a Democrat” or “Identifies as
a Republican” group and did not leave room for individuals who might identify as an
independent voter. Finally, participants were recruited from communication classes at the
University of Louisville, which suggests that they might not have been highly engaged
with political messages. Or, due to the focus of the class content, they therefore might be
more familiar with fake news, biases, and the third-person effect than the general
population. Lastly, there was a low level of internal consistency among the items
measuring perceived information accuracy in this sample, which could have negatively
affected the outcome of the statistical test that employed the composite perceived
information accuracy variable as the dependent variable.
Future Research
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With the increase of fake news on social media websites, people have to evaluate
the credibility of news and information more than ever. Future studies could ask if there
is a threshold of how much fake or inaccurate news users would tolerate on social media
before abandoning the platform. Another question that could be asked is if different
political parties perceive themselves as more vulnerable to fake news than other political
parties. From this study, we have seen that each political party sees the other as being
influenced by fake news, but how does each party see themselves in terms of
vulnerability to fake news. Finally, future research should include additional indications
of message popularity as moderators when testing the effect of disclaimers and message
concordance on the outcome measures studied here, as indicators such as the number of
likes, shares, and network source (e.g., which friend shared the post with you).
Summary
Thousands of fake news stories circulated social media involving politics and
social movements. Information circulating on social media during the 2016 election
made it difficult for some users to distinguish between factual and fake news. The efforts
of fake accounts spreading misinformation easily and quickly created a mistrust in news
coming from social media and forced users to use their best judgement when evaluating
information. Despite knowing about the false information, users still engaged with and
actively used social media during the peak of fake news.
From the data, it can be concluded that flagging posts on social media as
potentially false or disputed information does not appear to have a significant impact on
readers’ evaluations of the information. News on Facebook and other social media
platforms is already not as credible as news from traditional journalistic sources because
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of the ease and simplicity of creating and dispersing information. The findings of this
study suggest that more needs to be done by the social media platform in addition to
adding a disclaimer to questionable posts to help readers quickly and accurately identify
fake news and misinformation.
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Appendix A
Conditions

BLM UNITE
Yesterday a teenage boy was exiting his high school when cops accused him of recent crimes in the
area. A standoff began when the boy reached into his pocket to get his cellphone to call his mother.
Police took this as a threat and ordered the boy to raise his hands and stay still. They were able to
approach him, but kept guns drawn. He was then placed under arrest for possession of a weapon on
school property, resisting arrest, and threatening police officers.
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SUPPORT BLUE LIVES

Yesterday a teenage boy was exiting his high school when cops approached him to ask about
recent crimes in the area. A standoff began when the boy reached into his pocket to grab a weapon.
Police took this as a threat and ordered the boy to raise his hands and stay still. They were
eventually able to subdue him after he fought back. He was then placed under arrest for possession
of a weapon on school property, resisting arrest, and threatening police officers.

#BLUELIVESMATTER
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SUPPORT BLUE LIVES

Yesterday a teenage boy was exiting his high school when cops approached him to ask about
recent crimes in the area. A standoff began when the boy reached into his pocket to grab a weapon.
Police took this as a threat and ordered the boy to raise his hands and stay still. They were
eventually able to subdue him after he fought back. He was then placed under arrest for possession
of a weapon on school property, resisting arrest, and threatening police officers.

#BLUELIVESMATTER
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Appendix B
Dear Class,
You are being invited to participate in a research study by answering the attached survey
about news on social media. The survey is expected to take around 10 minutes and as a
thank you for participation your instructor may opt to offer extra credit to all participants.
We hope that this research will enable us to see how people interact with news on social
media.
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You do not have to answer any questions that make
you uncomfortable. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be in this study
you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop
taking part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify.
If you choose to participate please follow the link below:

https://goo.gl/sVC8sY
You will receive one follow up email after the initial to remind you of the opportunity. If
you have any questions about how your information will be used do not hesitate to ask
either (Aleeza Gardner/Dr. Sanders) or myself.
Sincerely,
Dr. Scott Sanders, Principal Investigator
Assistant Professor
University of Louisville, Dept. of Communication
310 Strickler Hall
Louisville, KY 40292
scott.sanders@louisville.edu
Aleeza Gardner, Co-Principal Investigator
Graduate Student
University of Louisville, Dept. of Communication
310 Strickler Hall
Louisville, KY 40292
aleeza.gardner@louisville.edu
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Appendix C
Questions:
Third Person Effect:
Overall how much do you think your attitudes are influenced by news on social media?
Overall how much do you think the attitudes of others would be influenced by news on social
media?
(McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997)
Perceived Information Accuracy (Message credibility):
The post was believable.
The post was accurate.
The post was authentic.
(Appleman & Sundar, 2016) - message credibility scale reflective measure of message credibility
Behavioral intent:
I am likely to share this post with my friends.
I am likely to follow this account to see future posts.
Demographic:
What year in school are you?
Do you actively use Facebook?
How many times a week do you log into your Facebook account?
I get my news from Facebook.
I follow national or local news station accounts on Facebook (NPR, Fox News, CNN)
I identify as: (race)
Is any member of your family employed in law enforcement?
Measures of Political Affiliation:
If you know nothing about either candidate other than political affiliation, how likely would you
be to vote for a democrat?
Overall how much do you think the attitudes of Democratic voters would be influenced by news
on social media?
Overall how much do you think the attitudes of Republicans voters would be influenced by news
on social media?
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